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MR. JUSTICE HOLMES has suggested that most distinctions are
distinctions of degree." The thought has frequently been echoed.
Yet legal science in large part moves on its way dichotomizing.
We classify the black and the white. We may recognize gray
borderlines. But the idea is not that. The idea is rather of a
continuous gradual deepening of the shading from top to bottom.
For example we may classify human conduct into "offers for a
contract" and "non-offers", admitting there are borderlines
where classification is difficult. But expectation aroused by con-
duct, the most significant element of an offer, may range all the
way -by minute gradations from complete assurance to faint
hope. And so with other classifications.
This holds significance for legal science. Every determination
by court or jury involves the evaluation of the varying ele-
ments of harm, benefit, the intelligence, morality, and social de-
sirability of conduct, and the relation of conduct to harm and
benefit. Each of these elements in turn is made up of innumerable
sub-elements, each with its infinity of shading.2 The reaction of ajudge or a juror to a human situation must be the resultant of
all the pulls of these elements his way and that.3 It is impossible
* Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law;
author of The Constitutionality of the Transferee Provisions of tho Revenue
Acts (1929) 29 CoL. L. Ray. 1052.
' Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 631, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 553 (1905).
"I am the last man in the world to quarrel with a distinction simply be-
cause it is one of degree. Most distinctions, in my opinion, are of that
sort, and are none thie worse for it."
2 Some idea of the complexity of the intertwining elements may be gained
from an analysis of the way in which the expectation of the parties entersin. Disappointment of expectation is one phase of harm. Not only thedegree of expectation is important, but the degree of disappointment, andthe degree in which the other party's conduct has contributed to the ex-pectation and to the disappointment. Intervening forces beyond the control
of either party may contribute to disappointment, as well as cause other
harms or benefits.
3 The strength of each pull will of course vary with the background and
temperament of the person who is called upon to judge. For a beautifullyphrased statement of the effect of background, see CARDozo, THE NATuImOF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 12. It will also vary with the vividness
with which the particular element is brought to his consciousness. SeeRadin, Permanent Problemns of the Law (1929) 15 CORN. L. Q. 1. The
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to take account of all the pulls by means of any system of doc-
trine.4 If there were only ten elements and ten shades of each,
that would make ten billion possible situations. Ten billion times
ten billion would not begin to exhaust the number of different
cases that might arise. By recognizing only the black and the
white we seem to reduce our problems to less formidable figures.
By rigidly adhering to this notion, we succeed in erecting doc-
trinal structures that doubtless exert influence upon judicial
decision. Yet we must admit that no rigidly logical system can
be devised that will not lead to results that often conflict in some
degree with the felt needs of a particular situation. It must
surely follow that the hope that logic will solve our problems
is a false hope. We cannot escape the pull of the elements.
Where the competing elements in a given situation are found
of nearly equal importance, the effort has with more or less
frankness been abandoned. Great question-begging concepts
have been created such as "material breach", "frolic of his
own", "proximate cause". Each of the verbal symbols used con-
tains some suggestion of one of the elements operating, but they
are sufficiently incapable of definition to permit a full play for
other elements. In equity with even greater frankness it is
frequently conceded that a decision must depend on the weigh-
ing of various factors, as is illustrated by the idea of the balance
of convenience.
In other situations where a few elements frequently stand
out overshadowing all others, it has been found possible to build
a concept of some vitality about them. Thus the concepts and
doctrines of offer and acceptance have been erected about the
element of expectation, the doctrine of consideration about the
elements of benefit and certain phases of morality. The doctrine
of impossibility is built around the supervening difficulties that
defeat expectation and cause other harm. And so with other
doctrines.6
sharpness -with which the events stand out, particularly the mental proc-
esses of the parties, is a matter of degree.
4 It is probably too well known to require mention that the place of
rules and doctrines in law administration and the difficulties of framing
rules that may logically be applied to produce the desired result has been
the main theme of a group of writers sometimes called "juristic realists".
For a list of writings on the subject, see, Llewellyn, Some RcaUian About
Realism (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222.
1 5 It is interesting to note that the Restatement of the Law of Contracts
of the American Law Institute makes no attempt to define "material
breach", but merely enumerates the elements to be considered. See Tenta-
tive Draft No. 6, section 270. Probably the other two concepts mentioned
will have to be treated in the same way.
6 That concepts create emphasis has been noted by Llewellyn. He says
that "to classify is to build emphases, to create stresses, which obscure some
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The difficulty is that each case involves a symphony whose
quality we attempt to determine by listening to each instrument
separately. When one instrument carries the motif, as often
happens, this method gives fairly satisfactory results. The ac-
companying instruments are not loud enough to change the
effect appreciably. Yet it is not infrequent that several blare
out at the same time and the method becomes doubtful. The
reason our past methods have yielded acceptable results is that
even our more rigid concepts have been sufficiently elastic to
permit of considerable leeway. Thus, to carry out the figure
of the symphony, while we purport to evaluate one instrument
at a time, we can always listen for the others. A decision is
articulated in terms of one or two instruments, but it may be
controlled by all.
Rules we have and must have for some purposes. Yet it is
impossible to understand the working of the judicial process
without also taking into account all the competing elements.
Dean Pound has said that in one way or another almost all
of the vexed questions of the science of law prove to be phases
of the problem of adjustment between rule and discretion.7 If
we adopt this terminology, the need is that we study discretion
as well as rule.
These fragmentary observations may serve as an introduction
to the study of a group of cases having to do with claims for
services and care in the home. These are very numerous. They
usually involve claims against the estates of deceased persons.
Arrangements for the care of aged persons by relatives or others
upon a promise to leave property at death are common and are
a prolific source of litigation.
Nature of the Promise
We begin with the cases that involve the rendering of services
without an express promise to give compensation. The doctrine
by which these are handled grew up with the action of assumpsit.
We are indebted to Professor Ames for a valuable historical
study of the doctrinal development.8 Prior to 1609 there appears
to be no case in the common law courts permitting recovery
where the sum to be paid had not been fixed by the parties.,
of the data under consideration and give fictitious value to others." A
Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step (1930) 30 COL. L. Rlv. 431, 453.
7POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 1.8 AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) Lecture XIV.
9 As the first case permitting recovery on an implied promise Ames cites
Warbrooke v. Griffin, 2 Brown]. 254 (1609). "Debt could not be maintained,
for that action was always for the recovery of a liquidated amount, As-
sumpsit would not lie for want of a promise." ADIES, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 154.
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But with the liberalization of assumpsit in the early seventeenth
century, and as a part of it, the claims of those rendering service
without a stipulated compensation came to receive recognition. '
Recovery was stated to be based on an implied promise, and
thus the doctrine grew. This of course meant that any conduct
that raised or fostered an expectation of compensation in the
mind of the other party would give rise to a claim. Although
other elements might affect the judgment or intuition of the
court in these cases, the dominant one seemed to be the degree
in which the defendant's conduct had created such expectation,
and it was natural that the question should be stated in terms
of that element.
In the modern cases the question is sometimes left to the jury
with the formula that the plaintiff may recover if a reasonable
person in his position would have expected payment.11 Or that
the defendant is bound if he reasonably should have expected
to pay.- The application of the "reasonable" formula is prompted
partly by the fact that the person who is judging usually has
no better way to determine what the parties thought than to
try to determine what he himself would have thought under
the circumstances. And of course he is reasonable. In the rare
cases where what the party thought stands out with distinctness
that will have its effect. If the party has been particularly un-
intelligent, there is another element that may exert a contrary
pull. The formula leaves room for that.
However, there is no uniformity of statement. In most juris-
dictions the usual expression is that the plaintiff may recover
if there was a mutual understanding or intention that the serv-
ices be paid for. 3 Probably this makes little or no difference
in the results reached. Whether the judge or jury believes there
was a mutual understanding or not will depend for the most part
on the objective facts. The actual expectation will be obscured
-1 Scholars differ as to the causes for the development of assumpsit. The
expansion of commerce, the decline of the borough and pie powder courts,
the extension of the business of the common law courts and the competition
of chancery tribunals may have had something to do with it. It was
partly a procedural reform. See Llewellyn, What Price Contract? (1931)
40 YATn L. J. 704, 741. "We do not know whether the fear of stout
swearers or the growth of commercial transactions was the more vital
factor in developing assumpsit."
"Bryant v. Fogg, 125 Ie. 420, 134 Atl. 510 (1926) ; Guild v. Guild, 32
Mlass. 129 (1833). See 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 36.
- Spencer v. Spencer, 181 Mass. 471, 63 N. E. 947 (1902).
3 Bartlett v. Raidart, 107 Conn. 691, 142 Atl. 398 (1928) ; In re Hamlin's
Estate, 223 Mich. 156, 193 N. W. 833 (1923); Bokelmann v. Bokelmann,
230 N. W. 478 (Alinn. 1930); Peters v. Poro, 96 Vt. 95, 117 Atl. 244 (1922).
There is not always consistency of statement in the same jurisdiction.
See Theron Ford Co. v. Dudley, 104 Conn. 519, 133 Atl. 746 (1926), a
case (not of household services) stating the formula objectively.
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by other circumstances in about the same degree as under the
reasonable expectation formula.
It will be noted also that many courts employ an elaborate
system of presumptions. It is said that whenever valuable serv-
ices are rendered at the request of or with the knowledge of
the recipient, an obligation to pay will be presumed, or that the
law implies a promise to pay.14 If, however, the plaintiff wag
a member of the same family as the defendant, the presumption
is that the services were gratuitously rendered." Usually the
family relationship is said to exist only where the parties were
members of the same household.,' But in this event there is no
necessity of blood or marriage relationship." These presump-
tions are built consciously about the expectation element. They
also take into account the degree of benefit, in that there are
usually reciprocal services between members of the same family.
Indeed where the presumptions break down is usually in the
cases in which it appears that a son or daughter has cared for
an aged parent while the others of the brothers and sisters are
using their energies in building their own fortunes."6 These
presumptions repeated with varying emphasis give to the judge
some control over the jury. They frequently give the appellate
court something upon which to hang a reversal."0
Many elements other than that of the expectation of the
parties enter into the decisions of such cases by judge or jury,
even when they do not fit into any doctrine or when for some
reason the doctrine that gives them emphasis cannot be em-
ployed. These are the degree in which the work has benefited
14 Newbert v. McCarthy, 190 Cal. 723, 214 Pac. 442 (1923); Peterson v.
Johnson, 205- Iowa 16, 212 N. AV. 138 (1927). The subject of presumptions
applicable to these cases is discussed in 3 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1920)
§§ 1442, 1447-1454.
'15 Many cases are reviewed in Note (1907) 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 874.
It is said that in some jurisdictions the relationship has the effect of over-
coming the presumption that payment is to be made, in some there is a
positive presumption that the services are gratuitous and in some this pre-
sumption may only be overcome by an express promise. Many of the caseg
cited in this article state these presumptions. For a statement of reasono
for refusing to recognize a positive presumption see Bryant v. Fogg, supra
note 11.
16 Page v. Page, 73 N. H. 305, 61 Atl. 356 (1905); Kerr v. Wilson, 284
Pa. 541, 131 Atl. 468 (1926). There is an occasional suggestion that blood
relationship is enough. Gopeevic v. Gopcevic, 39 Cal. App. 306, 178 Pac.
734 (1918).
-7 Ruble v. Richardson, 188 Cal. 150, 204 Pac. 572 (1922); Ingram v.
Basye, 67 Ore. 257, 135 Pac. 883 (1913).
18 See infra note 32.
-0 See, for example, Nissen v. Flournoy, 160 Ark. 311, 254 S. W. 540
(1923); Ingram v. Basye, supra note 17.
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the defendant,2 0 the profitableness of other employment open
to the plaintiff,21 the hardship involved in the labor,2 the degree
of the plaintiff's moral duty to render the service without com-
pensation,2 3 defendant's motive in having the work done, 4 the
financial circumstances of the parties.-2 5 Mlost of these matters
may have some probative value on the question of expectation. -
But they also have independent significance. Some of them are
avowedly to be considered in determining the amount of the
recovery.27  They also influence court and jury in the deter-
mination of the question whether there should be any recovery
at all. Moreover the amount of the jury verdict will probably
be affected by the degree of expectation and the vividness with
which the evidence shows expectation. There is thus little to
distinguish between the factors that determine liability and those
that determine the amount of the damages except in the matter
of emphasis.
The effect of these other elements is most sharply brought
out in the case of Ingram v. Basye.2- In this case the plaintiff,
an orphan girl, was taken by the defendants, husband and wife,
into their home at an early age. From reliable evidence it ap-
peared that she had been mistreated and compelled to work
long hours at difficult tasks, that she had become feeble in mind.
20 This is probably the most important. It is of significance in nearly
all the cases.
21 Clerget v. Williams, 176 Ark. 533, 3 S. W. (2d) 301 (1928) ; Bokelmaun
v. Bokelmann, supra note 13.
22Mayborne v. Citizens' Trust & Savings Bank, 46 Cal. App. 178, 188
Pac. 1034 (1920); Hudson v. Hudson, 218 Ii. App. 559 (1920); Wain-
wright Trust Co. v. Kinder, 69 Ind. App. 88, 120 N. E. 419 (1918);
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 204 Ky. 745, 265 S. W. 301 (1924) (little hardship).23 Mayborne v. Citizens' Trust & Savings Bank, supra. note 22; Wharton
v. Denny, 296 S. W. 183 (Mo. App. 1927); Jones v. Jones, 129 S. C. 8,
123 S. E. 763 (1924).
24Ingram v. Basye, supra note 17; Carlson v. Krantz, 172 Minn. 242,
214 N. W. 928 (1927) (not strictly household services).
25Plath v. Brunken, 102 Neb. 467, 167 N. W. 567 (1918). This is apt
to have more weight with a jury than with a court. See Carlson v. Krantz,
supra, note 24.
26 In Guild v. Guild, supra note 11, at 132, Chief Justice Shaw enum-
erates many elements that are to be considered as bearing on implied
promise. See also Peters v. Poro, sitpra note 13. In Bokelmann v.
Bokelmann, supra note 13, it is intimated that the profitableness of other
employment could not be considered on the question of damages but was
admissible as bearing on the plaintiff's expectation.
2 Doubtless the financial circumstances of the parties would never be
avowedly considered. In De Fevers' Executor v. Brooks, 203 Ky. 606, 262
S. W. 976 (1924), it is said that the hardship of the work should not be
considered on the measure of recovery.
2s Supra note 17. A case somewhat similar on its facts is Plath v.




At the age of thirty-six the plaintiff left at the instance of per-
sons who discovered her predicament. She sought recovery for
services rendered. The trial judge directed a verdict for the
defendants. On appeal it was held that the question whether
there was a family relationship should have been submitted to
the jury. Obviously the blows of the defendant did not have
any tendency to cause her to believe she would be paid. Yet
it is perfectly clear that the harsh treatment was the principal
factor in the decision. The stressing of the family relationship
brought that into play. The submission of the case to the jury
on that issue would draw attention away from the fact that
there could hardly have been any expectation of payment. The
fact that the defendants were saved the necessity of employing
a farm hand and the plaintiff's financial need may also have had
some influence. The harsh treatnent might have formed the
basis for recovery in tort, but for the fact that the statute of
limitations had probably run.
It is impossible to understand the many cases that are brought
to recover compensation for services rendered in the household
in caring for the sick and aged without taking into account the
fact that these are ordinarily claims against the estate of the
deceased recipient of the services. 29 Quite frequently there is
clearly no expectation of receiving wages. But the plaintiff has
hoped and has often been encouraged to expect remembrance in
the will. Recovery is usually allowed. 0 It must be noted that
the conduct or expectation of the deceased can have little effect
in these cases. Indeed this is true whatever the form of the
promise. The controversy is between the plaintiff and legatees
or distributees. Or it may be a contest between the plaintiff and
the general creditors of the deceasedA' In the former case the
conduct of the beneficiaries may have an important bearing on
the decision. Relatives of the deceased who have given little or
29 For a review of the Pennsylvania cases see Hutton, Claims for Sa'
ices, Attendance and Suppart Against Decedents' Estates (1931) 35 D1O%
L. REv. 48.
3o Mayborne v. Citizens' Trust & Savings Bank, supra note 22; Bartlett
v. Raidart, supra note 13; Wainwright Trust Co. v. Kinder, supra note 22
(probably little thought given to compensation); Peters v. Poro, upra
note 13. Recovery is denied on the ground that the only expectation was
for "a legacy in Gilbraith's Estate, 270 Pa. 288, 113 Atl. 361 (1921). It
is said that "this excludes the idea of a contractual 'relation." If wages
have been paid the expectation of a legacy in addition will not be the basis
for a recovery is held in Robinson v. Munn, 238 N. Y. 40, 143 N. E. 184
(1924). The receipt of a legacy will also usually defeat a claim for
services in addition. Hapke v. Hapke, 93 Okla. 180, 220 Pac. 660 (1023);
Brown v. McCurdy, 278 Pa. 19, 122 Atl. 169 (1923). But see Olson v.
Hagan, 102 Wash. 321, 172 Pac. 1173 (1918).
31 Gardner's Adminigtrator v. Schooley, 25 N. J. Eq. 150 (1874) ; Howell
v. Howell, 232 N. W. 816 (Iowa 1930).
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no thought to his welfare while living and have left the burden
to be borne by the patient plaintiff usually fare ill. The question
of actual expectation of payment, although it may be remotely
affected by such matters, is of little moment. Strong is the pull
for the plaintiff created by the unfilial conduct of a son or
daughter who has shirked the burden but is greedy to assert
a birthright.3
The presumption that services to relatives are gratuitous does
not give much trouble. If the plaintiff has left another home
for the pr-pose of taking care of the deceased, it is usually said
that the presumption is not applicable, since it is confined to
cases where the plaintiff was a member of the same household
prior to the request for serices.3 3 Or it may simply be said that
the presumption is overcome.34
There is little difficulty of administration in cases of this type.
The benefit received by the deceased and the hardship on the
plaintiff are not capable of much distortion. Expressions to the
effect that the plaintiff will be taken care of may be discounted
without materially affecting the case.
This brings us to the cases where it is claimed that there is
an express promise fixing the amount and nature of the com-
pensation, either before or after the work is performed. When
the claim is made after the promisor's death as is usually true
when it is for services in the household, a consideration of ad-
ministrative policy is involved similar to that of the Wills Acts.
If too much weight is given to such promises, the possibility
of fraud becomes great. In theory the worth of the services is
not material.
If the promise is oral or written but unsigned, and is for the
conveyance of real estate, the Statute of Frauds may be invoked.
32 Aldrich v. Aldrich, 287 Ill. 213, 122 N. E. 472 (1919); Snyder v.
Nixon, 188 Iowa 779, 176 N. W. 808 (1920); Peters v. Poro, szepra note
13. Seldom is it frankly admitted, yet it is refreshing to find one judge
speaklng what is in his mind. "It not unfrequently happens that those
who are 'old and only in the way' are bundled off upon some more amiable
member of the family, who uncomplainingly responds without the slightest
assistance from the complacently selfish; and in the contest which ensues,
really an effort to compel contribution based upon the same moral obli-
gation, the selfish appear consumed with a 'righteous indignation' at the
hardness of the claimant, which has as little sincerity as Judas exhibited
in his protest against the waste of the precious ointment . . ." Jones v.
Jones, 129 S. C. 8, 12-13, 123 S. E. 763, 764 (1924). Occasionally the mass
of litigation on the subject has caused judges to use severe exprcssion?
to discourage claimants. Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 129 Pa. 229, 18 At].
129 (1889). But, the claims are frequently so meritorious that they do not
yield to suppression.
- Estate of McLain, 126 Ore. 456, 270 Pac. 534 (1928) ; Kerr v. Wilson,
supra note 16.
34Nissen v. Flournoy, supra note 19; San Antonio v. Spencer, 82 Mont.
9, 264 Pac. 944 (1928).
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Recovery is allowed on a quantum meruit.3- The issues raised
are much the same as if no promise had been made. The Statute
is applied with varying degrees of strictness. Possession and
possibly improvements may be required.30 The services alone,
being the compensation, may be regarded as sufficient. 7 The
most flexible rule confines the Statute to the cases where the
services can be adequately compensated for in money.A' If the
contract is taken out of the Statute under the less flexible rule
requiring possession, however, it is said that the promise must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence.2 Courts, that employ
the test of possession are thus quite free to deny recovery if the
benefits of the services were slight.
If there is the claim of a promise not within the Statute a
safeguard may be found in the stricter rule of evidence. 4 , Or
it may be said that the words were merely expressions of inten-
tion to make a gift.41 The determination is frequently attended
with much difficulty as is shown by one case where after review-
ing the evidence in an opinion of twelve pages, the judge comes
to the conclusion that " the presentation. . . of this claim was
the result of a family conspiracy... to loot the estate of their
deceased friend." 42 And this was reversed on appeal.43
In general the express promise in cases of this kind, even
when in writing, is apt to have less effect upon one's judgment
of the situation than accords with the emphasis which accepted
legal theory gives it. In other words, freedom of bargaining is
"--Hensley v. Hilton, 191 Ind. 309, 131 N. E. 38 (1921) ; Walker v. Dill's
Administrator, 186 Ky. 638, 218 S. W. 247 (1920).36 Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922); Maddison
v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467 (1883). The statement that acts exclusively
or unequivocally referable to the agreement take the contract out of tho
Statute is apparently used whether the court is strict or liberal. Of.
Houlette v. Johnson, 205 Iowa 687, 216 N. W. 679 (1927). The require-
ment of possession frequently permits considerable leeway. See Warren
v. Warren, 105 Ill. 568 (1882); Best v. Gralapp, 69 Neb. 811, 99 N. W,
837 (1903).
3 Kissling v. Monticello State Bank, 203 Iowa 62, 212 N. W. 314 (1927).
38 Owens v. McNally, 113 Cal. 444, 45 Pac. 710 (1896); Flannery v.
Woolverton, 329 Ill. 424, 160 N. E. 762 (1928). Cases on the Statute of
Frauds applicable to this type of case are reviewed at length in Note (1930)
69 A. L. R. 14.
39 Yager v. Lyon, 337 Ill. 271, 169 N. E. 222 (1929) ; Soho v. Wimbrough,
145 Md. 498, 125 Atl. 767 (1924).
40 Davies's Estate, 289 Pa. 579, 137 Atl. 728 (1927); Herrick v. Hayes,
173 N. W. 110 (Iowa 1919) (recovery allowed for the value of the services).
The rule of evidence that a party making a claim against an estate may
not testify as to a transaction with the decedent sometimes operates to
exclude evidence of a promise. See Ruble v. Richardson, supra, note 17.
41 Herrick v. Hayes, supra note 40; Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra note 22;
Robinson v. Munn, supra note 30.
- In re Estate of Brush, 136 Misc. 581, 240 N. Y. Supp. 380 (1930).
3 in re McLaren, 244 N. Y. Supp. 921 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1930).
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not so desirable in the situations with which we are here dealing.
The strengthened expectation and the fact that the promisor
has broken his promise may be overbalanced if the benefit is
slight or the promisee was in a position to exert influence on
the promisor. If the promisor is dead, the moral opprobrium
connected with the failure to keep the promise is not much of
a factor, and in any case it may be considerably mitigated by
intervening factors that make performance more difficult or the
plaintiff less worthy. The beneficial effect of the services and
the relationship of the parties are thus the important factors.*
It is the attempt to apply here rules that were developed for
the commercial world that compels the courts to find many ways
to minimize the effects of the promise. As we have already seen,
if the promise is oral, the Statute of Frauds and the strict rule
of evidence may be employed. If the promise is contained in a
signed writing or if a deed to property has been given, other
methods of attack must be found. The well recognized doctrine
of failure of consideration may be employed to defeat the promise
or permit the recovery of property. It is frequently possible to
say that the services have not been rendered as contemplated. 4
Another much used theory of attack is that of undue influence.
The formulas for presenting this question are not standardized
in wording, but they leave about the same impression. They usu-
ally are to the effect that undue influence consists of pressure
or influence of persons in confidential relation so that the sub-
ject is not left to act voluntarily.5 This puts the question as
one of fact, so that it may be submitted to the jUry.4 Usually,
however, the case is in equity and the court decides. Obviously
this statement brings into the foreground very important mat-
ters. The mental condition of the promisor, and the pressure
exerted by the plaintiff are factors in all the cases. The formula
here, however, is sufficiently loose to permit taking into account
the beneficial character of the services and the deserving quali-
ties of the persons who will take if the plaintiff's claim is
denied.47
Creditors of the deceased may also attack a conveyance on
the ground that it was fraudulent. s Although the state of mind
44 Black v. Hill, 117 Ark. 228, 174 S. W. 526 (1915); Matthews v. Tobias,
126 Ore. 358, 268 Pac. 988 (1928).
45 Peacock v. Du Bois, 90 Fla. 162, 105 So. 321 (1925). See also Bur-
roughs v. Reed, 150 Ga. 724, 105 S. E. 290 (1920).
4 Leedom v. Palmer, 274 Pa. 22, 117 AtI. 410 (1922).
1,7 Benner v. Dove, 283 fl. 318, 119 N. E. 349 (1918) ; Kissling v. M3onti-
cello State Bank, supra note 37; Watson v. Watson, 190 Ky. 270, 227 S. W.
270 (1921); Bade v. Feay, 63 W. Va. 166, 61 S. E. 348 (1907).
48 Howell v. Howell, 232 N. W. 816 (Io'wa 1930). The conveyance was
upheld in Michaud v. Michaud, 151 Atl. 559 (Me. 1930) and Torrey Cedar
Co. v. Eul, 95 Wis. 615, 70 N. W. 823 (1897).
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of the grantor here becomes of importance, the beneficial char-
acter of the services is probably the most outstanding issue.
Thus far we have been dealing with promises made before
the rendition of the services. Promises made after the services
require a different treatment. The subsequent promise may
make the case a little stronger for the plaintiff than if no promise
had been made. But it has less significance than a prior promise.
And we have already seen that such a promise may be easily
overshadowed by other factors. Instead of relying on the various
methods employed to control the effect of a prior promise, how-
ever, courts have usually submerged the subsequent promise by
saying that it is not supported by consideration unless there was
a prior enforceable claim.49
A few courts have stressed the subsequent promise by stating
the question as one of moral consideration." This enables the
court in a jury trial to direct a verdict for the plaintiff on the
finding of the fact of the services and the promise without leav-
ing the question to the jury as to the expectation of payment
for the services previously rendered. It gives the appellate court
more power in any case by removing this question from the
consideration of the trier of the facts. But in general, juries
are not apt to be too harsh toward the claimant in such cases.
There has thus been no call for a doctrine that removes the
issue from the trier of facts. Juries are well suited for passing
upon the questions here presented, involving, as they do, many
ordinary details of living. Furthermore in the case of an oral
promise the doctrine of moral consideration as applied he'e,
puts a heavier burden on administration since the fact of the
promise, a difficult matter to determine, becomes the most mate-
rial. It is probably for these reasons that most courts reject
the doctrine. 51 Whether there was consideration then depends
upon a prior enforceable claim. The issue is thus presented as
if the promise had never been made, except that if the amount
is fixed in the promise, that will determine the amount of
49 Walker v. Brown, 104 Ga. 357, 30 S. E. 867 (1898).
50 Sutch's Estate, 201 Pa. 305, 50 Atl. 943 (1902); Alexander v. Lewes,
104 Wash. 32, 175 Pac. 572 (1918).
51 Graf v. Graf, 150 Ky. 226, 150 S. W. 58 (1912); Eatmon v. Penland,
119 Okla. 180, 249 Pac. 387 (1926); Ogdin v. First National Bank, 103
W. Va. 665, 138 S. E. 376 (1927).
In Peters v. Poro, supra note 13, the claimant had rendered services to
her mother and brother, now deceased. The claim was brought against
the estate of another brother to whom all the property of the first brother
had been conveyed. The other claimants to this estate were sisters who
had rendered no service. The court refused to support the promise of
the deceased to pay' for the services on the doctrine of moral consideration,
but held that the case might be submitted to the jury on the theory of
novation. ,
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recovery.5 2 Even this may be avoided if the amount is excessive
by the formula that if the deceased intended to go beyond
the actual indebtedness and made the rest as a gift the recovery
should be limited to the actual indebtednessP 3
Relatiowship of the Parties
The doctrines discussed thus far suffice in dealing with the ques-
tions that arise when the services are rendered by persons having
no relationship to the recipient or by adult relatives. When the
plaintiff is a wife, minor child, mistress or supposed wife, many
of the same considerations are involved and many of the same
doctrines may be employed. But there are also additional mat-
ters to consider and more doctrines.
It may be due in part to the relatively small importance of the
promise that a wife who renders service in the household under
an express promise for payment is denied recovery. There are
also other factors. Here the mutual exchange of services and
support makes the benefit slight. There is doubtless a feeling
against commercializing the marriage relation. The law having
provided for the widow, a court is reluctant to increase her
share of the husband's estate at the expense of the children.
The rights of creditors have also to be considered. The contest
usually comes, however, between the widow and children by a
former wife. If the claim is for services after the marriage, the
doctrine of consideration may be applied, the performance being
regarded as something the plaintiff was already legally bound
to do. In the case of a contract made before the marriage,
it would seem that technically it is difficult to make use of the
doctrine to deny recovery, yet it has been invoked in such a
case also.55 Public policy is also usually mentioned.
Because of the infrequency of cases, no technique has yet been
52 Caldwell v. Lucas, 233 N. Y. 248, 135 N. E. 321 (1922). The subse-
quent history of the case appears in Caldwell v. Nicolson, 235 N. Y. 209,
139 N. E. 243 (1923); Keys, Administrator v. Keys, 93 IV. Va. 3", 116
S. E. 681 (1923).
53Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596 (1876). It has been held, however, that
the promise for the full amount may be upheld even if part of it was
intended as a gift. Bade v. Feay, supra note 47.
34 Michigan,. Trust Co. v. Chapin, 106 Mich. 384, 64 N. W. 34 (1895);
Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17 (1883); Bohanan v. Maxwell, 190 Iowa 1308,
181 N. W. 633 (1921). If the claim is for services before marriage it
must be handled as any other claim. Harper v. Dais, 115 Md. 349, 80
Atl. 1012 (1911). Formerly recovery was denied even if the services were
outside the household. See In re Callister, 153 N. Y. 294, 47 N. E. 268
(1897). But since women have become increasingly independent that is
no longer true if there is an express promise. In Re Estate of Cormick,
100 Neb. 669, 160 N. W. 989 (1916).
ss Bohanan v. Maxwell, supra note 54.
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evolved to care for the rare case where the services have been of
value out of all proportion to the support received and the
amount of the widow's share in the estate given by law. If the
claim of the widow is stronger due to the fact that no children
are competing, this is ordinarily taken care of by the statute
of distributions, which gives the widow a greater share of the
estate in such cases.50
A minor child stands on a different footing in that he may
be disinherited and further he may be competing with brothers
or sisters who have rendered no service. Although it is said
that the parent is entitled to the services of a minor child, 7 if
there has been a promise to pay for them it is ordinarily held
that the child has been emancipated and he may recover against
the estate.5 8 or may succeed in competition with the parent's
creditors.5o
Services by a mistress involve peculiar considerations. No pro-
vision by law is made for a share in the estate as in the case
of a wife. A woman in such a position is a natural object of
bounty. On the other hand social condemnation of the illicit
relations may work to the prejudice of the claim. The weight
given to this element will vary with the moral standards and
tolerance of the judge and jury before whom the case is brought.
It is usually although not universally held that there can be no
recovery by a mistress on an implied promise.20 This is not a
presumption based upon probable expectation but apparently a
rule of policy. Just why it should be such is a little difficult to
see in view of the fact that recovery on an express contract is
not always denied. It would seem to offer a convenient way in
states not recognizing common law marriages to make provision
for a faithful mistress. Denial of recovery on implied promises
is doubtless merely a concession to the moral code. It should
not be the occasion of much difficulty, since in nearly all cases
something may be offered that will pass for an express promise.
The formula developed for this type of case is unique and
brings rather directly into play the element of the value of the
services. It is said that there can be no recovery if the contract
is made in contemplation of the illicit relation or if the cohabita-
tion formed part of the consideration.0 1 If the services were
valuable, if they are worth the sum to be allowed, that would
seem to indicate that the cohabitation was not a part of the
5 01 WOERNER, ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1923) § 67.
57 Farley v. Stacey, 177 Ky. 109, 197 S. W. 636 (1917).
r8 Wright v. Dean, 79 Ind. 407 (1881); Hall v. Hall, 44 N. H. 293 (1802).
59 McDaniel v. Parish, 4 App. D. C. 213 (1894).
60 Brown v. Tuttle, 80 Me. 162, 13 Atl. 583 (1888).
61 Emmerson v. Botkin, 26 Okla. 218, 109 Pac. 531 (1910); Stewart v.
Waterman, 97 Vt. 408, 123 Atl. 524 (1924).
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consideration. This is a question that may be left the jury.c2
Of course the formula permits full play for all the elements and
for the moral biases of court or jury.
Services rendered to a supposed husband by a plaintiff who
thought herself his wife seem to come in naturally here, al-
though the question of recovery involves elements that are dif-
ferent. There is no moral condemnation for the plaintiff. Al-
though she had no idea of receiving compensation, she will be
disappointed in failing to receive a widow's share. There may be
humiliation upon the discovery of the truth. There has been
the possible loss of other prospects in life due to the deceitful
conduct of the supposed husband. It is not difficult to see that
these are the elements supposed to appertain to tort cases. It
is not entirely -without reason that the Massachusetts court has
refused recovery in assumpsit in such cases and has allowed it
in tort.6 That the representation may be regarded as one of
law is easily answered by holding that there may be recovery
for deceit of this kind when there is a confidential relation.
The fact that the supposed husband has received a benefit is
suggestive of quasi-contract. There isono great strain on legal
theory if recovery is permitted in assumpsit for the value of the
services. This may in a meritorious case offer a way to avoid
the effect of the shorter period of limitation for tort claims and
the rule that a tort claim dies with the tortfeasor."
The chief variable factor in these cases will be the knowledge
of the woman. Did she have suspicion or cause for suspicion?
A question of degree, of course. Cases that are close may hinge
on the evaluation of this element. In tort it may be put as the
question whether the woman was deceived.6 In assumpsit good
faith is made a requirement." Since the lack of intelligence of
the woman does not count much against her, the stricter require-
ment of reasonableness is not usually established. These cases
at this point may merge into those involving services by mis-
tresses. There may be other elements that will overcome the
moral condemnation occasioned by the doubt of the plaintiff's
belief in her wifehood.
Another situation that bears some similarity to the one just
discussed is that of a child who lives and serves in the family
of foster parents believing them to be his true parents. Because
62 Stewart v. Waterman, supra note 61.
63 Jekshewitz v. Groswald, 265 lass. 413, 164 N. E. 609 (1929) (tort);
Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mlass. 370, 17 N. E. 892 (1888) (assumpsit).
6- Sanders v. Regan, 172 N. C. 612, 90 S. E. 777 (1916); Wolf v. Fox,
178 Wis. 369,190 N. W. 90 (1922). It is to be noted that in Massachusetts
tort claims may be enforced against the estate of a deceased tort-feasor.
MlAss. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 230, § 1.
- Jekshewitz v. Groswald, supra note 63.
68 Wolf v. Fox, stpra note 64.
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the services are ordinarily slight and there is no element of
humiliation caused by the foster parents' conduct, recovery has
been denied both in assumpsit and tort.0 7
Uncontemplated Termination of Services
So much for the question of recovery when the services have
been carried through as contemplated. We now come to a group
of cases involving the premature termination of the services.
Here the considerations are somewhat different and call for the
use of a different set of doctrines.
Services rendered without any definite arrangements as to the
length of the service or the compensation present no question.
Compensation is given for their value regardless of the causes
for their termination. 68  The question arises, however, where
there is a definite arrangement. The usual case involves the
care of an old person for the rest of his life, and there may be a
stated compensation, ordinarily a part or all of his property. The
services may be brought to an end sooner than the parties ex-
pected by the sickness or death of the person who is rendering
the service or by discord caused by unexpected difficulties that
the care involves, by misunderstanding, or by personal friction
in the little details of life. The alternatives are to deny the
claimant any recovery, to allow the value of the services ren-
dered, or to allow the whole compensation, usually certain prop-
erty that the personal representatives of the recipient will be
ordered to convey. Allowance may be made for the services un-
performed by means of a conditional decree.", Remedies avail-
able before the death of the promisor must also be considered.
If performance is interrupted by sickness or death of the oie
rendering the service it might seem that there would be no
question as to the recovery for the value of the services per-
formed. That is true in ordinary cases of impossibility. How-
ever, this overlooks the fact that we are not dealing with a trans-
action that is truly commercial. It savors of an exchange of
67 Graham v. Stanton, 177 Mass. 321, 58 N. E. 1023 (1901) (assumpsit);
Miller v. Pelzer, 159 Minn. 375, 199 N. W. 97 (1924) (tort). Another
variation that may be mentioned here is involved in the case where persons
seek recovery for care of a minor child who has been taken into the house-
hold. Recovery is usually denied. Sherman v. Davidson, 123 Ian. 09,
254 Pac. 351. (1927). But if the assumption was that the plaintiffs were
to keep the child as their own and the parents obtain custody through
a court proceeding, recovery has been allowed. Hendryx v. Turner, 109
Wash. 672, 187 Pac. 372 (1920).
6sPlatt v. Brunken, supra note 25; Ingram v. Basye, mupra note 17.
69 Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo. 37 (1870). No allowance was made for
services unperformed in Clancy v. Flusky, 187 Ill. 605, 58 N. E. 594 (1900).
In Alexander v. Lewes, supra note 50, the conveyance was ordered subject
to a mortgage placed on the property after the contract was made.
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gifts70 This element may be insufficient to defeat the promisee
when he is competing with others who have not been equally
generous. But it may lead a court to feel that heirs of. the
promisee should not stand precisely in his shoes. The promisor
may need all his property to induce others to take the place of
the deceased in providing care and comfort for the remainder of
his years. If the problem arises after his death the deserv.ing
character of the contesting claimants is apt to loom large. The
virtue of the deceased performer of the services will in any
event be of little significance. One court has suggested a fiexible
formula that makes the question depend upon whether it was the
understanding between the parties when the services were under-
taken that the promisor should pay for the value of the services
in the event of the earlier death of the promisee. A case can
be decided either way under this formula. Sometimes it is
simply stated that such contracts are personal, and cannot be
enforced if the performer dies.7" A promisee who becomes in-
curably ill will doubtless quite uniformly be permitted to recover
the value of the services1 3
Services terminated because of discord between the parties
present as their outstanding elements the degrees in which the
respective parties are at fault. Their intelligence and especially
the moral quality of their acts and motives are subject to infinite
variation. The plaintiff who has been unreasonable, unkind, un-
70 The gift nature of these transactions is recognized in inheritance tax
cases which incline to hold the property received for services taxable.
People v. Porter, 287 Ill. 401, 123 N. E. 59 (1919). Some statutes provide
that transfers to take effect at death are to be taxed at an amount ar-
rived at by subtracting the value of the consideration from the value of
the property. See N. Y. CoNs. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 61, § 220. Some
provide that devises and bequests for services should be taxed after de-
ducting the reasonable value of the services. See W. VA. CODE (1931)
c. 11, art. 11, § 6.
7 1 More v. Luther, 153 Mich. 206, 116 N. W. 986 (1908). Professor
Williston expresses the opinion that this was a gratuitous conditional
promise. 3 CONTRAcTS (1920) § 1973 n. This suggests another way of
handling such cases. 'Whether it was gratuitous or not might then depend
upon whether the performer of the services lived.
The representative of the deceased performer was permitted to recover
in Stanley v. Kimball, 80 N. H. 431, 118 Atl. 636 (1922); Parker v.
Macomber, 17 R. I. 6T4, 24 Aft. 464 (1892). The same considerations are
present when it is sought to set aside a conveyance of property to the
performer after his death. This was permitted in Beard v. Beard, 200
Ky. 4, 254 S. W. 430 (1923). It was denied in Flanagan v. Flanagan, 133
Md. 332, 105 Atl. 299 (1918), the court saying that the only ground for
setting aside the conveyance would be the fraud in not intending to perform
the services, and there could be no presumption of such fraud where the
performer died. See infra note 82.
72 Alexander v. Lewes, supra note 50.
73 See Preble v. Preble, 115 Me. 26, 97 Atl. 9 (1916).
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filial or unwilling to make any allowance for the infirmities of
age, has little to commend his claim.74 Though his task may have
been more disagreeable than anticipated, he cannot bundle the
old man off to the poorhouse and still have the benefits of his
contract. A court or jury can without any qualms even see him
go unrecompensed for services rendered or money expended for
support. The rule that one who breaks his contract cannot re-
cover for the performance rendered finds acceptable applica-
tion:75
There has been no occasion to use the method of handling such
cases employed in some jurisdictions in labor cases whereby re-
covery is allowed on a quantum meruit in spite of a breach and
the defendant left to a counterclaim.71 This permits a nice ad-
justment but it gives the jury much power. It would not work
well here. Damages for the plaintiff's breach are difficult to
ascertain if the recipient of the service is living. If he is dead
the plaintiff might profit from his early demise. That would
scarcely meet with approval.
If the parties are nearly equal in fault or if the recipient is
clearly at fault, the problem bears a different aspect. When a
person with no family ties undertakes the service and a sever-
ance of the relation would not leave the other party without
provision for his old age, the sympathy of the court will usually
be for allowing a recompense. A way may usually be found for
giving the value of the services, even if it is not desirable to have
the property tied up. It may be held in the event of misunder-
standing that there has been no contract, and recovery may be
had on a quantum meruit. 7  The contract may be regarded as
within the Statute of Frauds."" If action is brought on a quantum
meruit, it may be held that the defendant has broken the contract
and the action constituted an election to r6scind.' A plaintiff
who has been turned off without any cause may not have specific
performance to compel the acceptance of the services but may
have a claim for damages.8 0 If giving a home during life was
not a part of the contract it may be necessary to invoke the
74 Ptacek v. Pisa, 231 Ill. 522, 83 N. E. 221 (1907). In Roberts ,
Johnson, 152 Ga. 746, 111 S. E. 194 (1921), recovery was denied on the
contract. Probably it would have been denied on a quantum memdt also.
75 Ptacek v. Pisa, supra note 74.
76 Lynn v. Seby, 29 N. D. 420, 151 N. W. 31 (1915); Britton v. Turner,
6 N. H. 481 (1834). This doctrine was considered and rejected in Thurs-
ton v. Nutter, 125 Me. 411, 134 Atl. 506 (1926).
S'7 Thurston v. Nutter, supra note 76.
78 Carter v. Witherspoon, 126 So. 388 (Miss. 1930).
79 Welch v. Gunn, 281 Pac. 704 (Cal. App. 1929); Hayman v. Davis,
182 N. C. 563, 109 S. E. 554 (1921). See also Thurston v. Nuttor, upra
note 76.
80 Poe v. Kemp, 206 Ala. 228, 89 So. 716 (1921).
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doctrine of anticipatory breach."'
The discord occasioned by the unreasonable demands and
idiosyncrasies of age give us more perplexing problems. Here
is a delicate human situation calling for utmost tact, ingenuity,
knowledge of human nature and ability to allow for the needs of
the particular case. The courts have met the demand well.
The person performing the service may have given up other
prospects in life. He may have treated the old person with con-
sideration and kindness. He may have performed disagreeable
duties, or put up with unpleasant personal habits of the recipient.
Such merit cannot go without its expected reward. On the other
hand although the old person has been unreasonable in his de-
mands, although he has been imposed upon by designing indi-
viduals who have tried to upset the arrangement, a court can-
not with equanimity see him entirely deprived of his property
or force him to accept the proffered care or be thrown on the
-world a public charge. This element is overshadowing, but still
it does not eclipse the performer's merit. To meet all these
demands requires flexibility and judicial tact. If reconciliation
is possible, a few suggestions may bring the parties together.
A disposition of the case that would thwart a re-establishment of
the relation should be avoided. Here a trial judge may find
opportunity for effective work in chambers.
The elements, each varying in degree, that must determine the
disposition are the merit of ihe performer, the amount of service
already rendered, the existing state of feeling between the
parties, the desire of the performer for the particular property
promised, the hardship involved if the performer is compelled to
change his living arrangements, the amount of other property
owned by the aged persons, the state of feeling between him and
other persons who might take charge of him, the general fair-
ness of the arrangement as originally entered into, pressure ex-
erted to influence the aged person to make the arrangement. The
reasonableness of the action of the aged person blends with many
of the other elements. In itself it is probably of minor im-
portance.
Whether the property has been conveyed or whether it has
merely been promised will make a difference as to who has the
laboring oar. It has little effect on the nature of the disposition
to be made. In the event that the property has been conveyed,
a suit will be brought to set aside the conveyance on the ground
of undue influence or failure of consideration. If the defendant's
merit is not great, if he is not in possession or there would be
no great hardship in ousting him, if the plaintiff is in need of a
place to stay, the conveyance may be set aside and the aged
83 Carter v. Witherspoon, supra note 78.
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person reestablished in the possession of the property. 2 It may
be required that compensation be given for the value of the
services . 3 That, however, may be too onerous for a meritorious
performer. It may be desirable to permit him to retain the
property. If the aged person has other means of support, or has
subsequently died, that is, perhaps, all that is necessary.84 But
in many cases that will leave him penniless. It may then be
required that provision be made out of the property for his sup-
port. The theory on which that may be done is not so clear. A
promise to do so may not be found. Performance may have been
rendered in so far as it has not been prevented by the recipient
of the services. But on broad equitable grounds it has been
found possible to make such a disposition. 5
A case of considerable human interest which shows us a court
of equity at its best is McKnight v. McKnight.fr The plaintiff
in that case was the stepmother of one of the defendants, the
other defendant being the husband of the first. After the death
of the plaintiff's husband, an arrangement was made whereby
the defendants were to come to live with the plaintiff and care
for her. In exchange they were to receive the plaintiff's prop-
erty amounting to about $7,000, including the home. They sold
their own home and furniture in pursuance of the arrangement,
but were not able to realize a good price. The property was
conveyed by plaintiff to the defendants. The parties lived
harmoniously for more than a year. The plaintiff then left for
a visit with friends and did not return except for short intervals.
After a year and a half the plaintiff demanded the return of
her property. Upon refusal, the suit was brought to set aside
the conveyance on the ground of undue influence and failure of
performance. It appeared that the defendants had treated the
plaintiff with kindness. Such grievances as she was able to
muster seemed to be afterthoughts. The arrangement as origi-
82 Hensan v. Cooksey, 237 Ill. 620, 86 N. E. 1107 (1908); Lockwood v.
Lockwood, 124 Mich. 627, 83 N. W. 613 (1900); Tipton v. Tipton, 118
Tenn. 691, 104 S. W. 237 (1907). It may be noted here that some courts,
doubtless because they treat these cases as analogous to those in which a
money consideration has partly failed, say the conveyance cannot be seat
aside for failure of consideration. Schott v. Schott, 168 Cal. 342, 143 Pac.
595 (1914). It is then necessary to say there was fraud in not intending
to give the promised care.. See Hyman v. Langston, 210 Ala. 509, 98
So. 564 (1923).
83 Hensan v. Cooksey, supra note 82.
4 Brackenbury v. Hodgkin, 116 Me. 399, 102 Aft. 106 (1917); White v.
Mooney, 73 W. Va. 304, 80 S. E. 844 (1913).
85 McKnight v. McKnight, 212 Mich. 318, 180 N. W. 437 (1920). In
Neyland v. Black, 238 S. W. 304 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922), it is suggested
that damages could be allowed that would constitute a lien on the property
although it does not appear that the grantees were at fault.
SBsSupra note 85.
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nally made was fair and the old lady had been the first to suggest
it according to the evidence. It was difficult to escape the sus-
picion that the parties whom she had visited had fermented
dissatisfaction. The plaintiffs remained willing to take her back.
The old lady had no other means of support. If she did not return
and no provision was made for her she might become a public
charge. After the trial while the appeal was pending she was
taken ill and returned to the defendants. The court denied the
relief sought. Very wisely it left the way open for a reconcilia-
tion, but remanded the case with instructions that if it could
not be effected, an allowance was to be made to the old lady for
her support and care by the defendants.
In the event that there has been no conveyance the court must
state the disposition in another form. The suit is then brought
by the performer of the services. The defenses will be undue
influence, the defendant's failure of performance, or general lack
of equity. In some cases a sufficient remedy for the plaintiff
will be an action at law for damages, or merely for the value of
the services. The allowance of a large claim in the lifetime of
the recipient, however, may leave him with inadequate provision
for support. Frequently the plaintiff in such a suit is given
possession or protected in his existing possession of the property
and the conveyance of the property is enjoined67 Of course no
subsequent purchaser could defeat the claim, since the possession
would constitute constructive notice. If the aged person has in-
sufficient other property, an allowance may be made to him in
the form of rentV8
Sunvnawy
Throughout all these cases bargaining plays a part but a sub-
ordinate one. For that there are a number of reasons. The semi-
gift nature of the transaction softens the outlines, of the bargain.
The frequently waning intellectual powers of the person receiv-
ing the service puts him on an inequality. The evidence of the
terms is often unsatisfactory. The persons interested may not
have been parties to the bargain and may bear other relations
to the parties that cannot be ignored. 0
The adaptability of our system of law administration is most
cogently illustrated in the handling of these cases. Here are the
87 White v. Massee, 202 Iowa 1304, 211 N. W. 839 (1927). Or the decree
is that the defendant hold as trustee. Gupton v. Gupton, supra note 69.
If it is desirable that the aged person should have possession, the decree
may be that the plaintiff is entitled to a deed, possession being reserved
for the defendant. On the subject generally of remedies during the
promisor's lifetime on contracts to convey property see Note (1930) 6G
A. L. R. 1439.
88 White v. Massee, supra note 87.
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same rules and doctrines used in the commercial field made to
yield acceptable results in a field that is concerned with vastly
different problems.,9 And in general we can but admire the solu-
tions reached. That is probably due in part to the fact that
courts are here dealing with situations that the rapidly changing
character of society in the last century has for the most part
left untouched. Furthermore, the concepts that have been gen-
erally used, although they serve the purpose of emphasizing the
dominant elements in the cases, have been sufficiently flexible
to permit free play for all the elements. Finally and most im-
portant of all, the situations are simple in the sense that they
are within the range of common experience. Judges have had
little difficulty in seeing vividly just what has been involved and
what the parties were trying to accomplish. In the grasp of
the realities of a situation, whatever may be the field, lies the
chief assurance of acceptable law administration.
89 Cf. Llewellyn's statement: "Perhaps .... contracts in what we may
broadly call ,family relations do not work out in general as they do in
business." Op. cit. supra, note 4, at 1240.
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